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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio had its third attempt to clarify Ohio’s
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil—and it failed. Piercing the corporate veil is
one of the most criticized and litigated issues of corporate law, 1 and it has been

∗

J.D. expected 2010, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law;
B.A. Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. Thank you to Brenda Sweet for her thoughtful
suggestion of this topic. And a special thank you to Tony Kresser for his love and laughter
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1
See Lee C. Hodge & Andrew B. Sachs, Piercing the Mist: Bringing the Thompson Study
into the 1990s, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 341 (2008) (citing Robert B. Thompson,
Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 (1991))
(finding similar results to the Thompson study); Kurt A. Strasser, Piercing the Veil in
Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637, 637, 641 (2005).

951

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

1

952

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:951

described as something that is “rare, severe, and unprincipled.” 2 The doctrine is
meant to hold companies’ shareholders accountable for harms committed behind the
veil of the corporate form. But piercing is not as easy as it sounds. Generally,
piercing the corporate veil is an equitable doctrine that should be used only in limited
circumstances. What these limited circumstances are, however, is widely disputed
among courts throughout the country.
This dispute is no less prevalent in Ohio, where, until recently, the state courts of
appeals were in conflict as to what circumstances warranted piercing the corporate
veil. Some appellate districts held that only “fraud or an illegal act” on the part of
the corporation would allow a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil, and others held
that an “inequitable or unjust act” would suffice. In Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 3
the Supreme Court of Ohio modified the Belvedere test, which describes when a
plaintiff may pierce the corporate veil. Specifically, the Court added that a
company’s “fraud, . . . illegal act, or . . . similarly unlawful act” may justify piercing
the corporate veil. 4 With this modification, the Supreme Court of Ohio hoped to
resolve the confusion among the appellate districts.
The Court’s modification, however, fails to articulate a workable standard for
lower courts. The Supreme Court of Ohio has previously addressed the issue as to
what type of misconduct warrants piercing the corporate veil, and both of its
attempts to do so in North v. Higbee Co. 5 and in Belvedere Condominium Unit
Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos. 6 have conflicted the appellate districts. 7 The
court’s previous phrases—“fraud” and “fraud or an illegal act”—have already
conflicted the appellate courts, and its new language in Dombroski is no less
confusing.
Because the Supreme Court of Ohio’s modification of the Belvedere test is
merely cosmetic and not substantive, it will not successfully resolve the conflict
among the appellate districts. Instead, the Court has caused a new cycle of
uncertainty and inevitable conflict among the appellate courts as to the meaning of
“similarly unlawful acts.” To prevent another split over the same issue of what
conduct permits piercing the corporate veil, the Supreme Court of Ohio should set
forth a clear standard in which “fraud or similarly wrongful acts” will warrant
piercing. This standard would be consistent with the purposes and traditions of the
doctrine in Ohio.
Part II.A of this Comment will discuss the history and purpose of the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil. Part II.B will describe the evolution of this doctrine
within Ohio from the development of the Belvedere three-part test, through the
conflict among the courts of appeals that gave rise to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s

2

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985).
3

Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538 (Ohio 2008).

4

Id. at 545 (emphasis added).

5

North v. Higbee Co., 3 N.E.2d 391 (Ohio 1936).

6

Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075 (Ohio
1993).
7

See infra Part II.B.
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latest attempt at clarification. Part III will discuss the facts and procedural history of
Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc. Part IV.A will show how the Supreme Court of Ohio’s
modification of the Belvedere test will inevitably cause another conflict among the
courts of appeals. Part IV.B will explain that the Supreme Court of Ohio must adopt
a clear standard that permits piercing for “fraud or similarly wrongful acts” to avoid
another conflict among Ohio’s courts of appeals.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil
A fundamental concept of corporate law is that a corporation exists as a legal
entity that is separate from its owners and operators. 8 Because a corporation is
legally independent, its shareholders enjoy the benefit of limited liability. 9 Under
the principle of limited liability, owners, directors, and shareholders are not liable for
the obligations and liabilities of the corporation. 10 Additionally, shareholders are
liable only up to the amount of their investments in the corporation. 11
There are times, however, when limited liability would allow a corporation to get
away with exceptionally wrongful behavior. When this occurs, the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil serves as a type of “safety valve” to allow plaintiffs to
disregard the corporate entity and hold its shareholders and owners personally
liable. 12 Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable doctrine, and it is applied in very
limited circumstances. 13 Although there is no clear test for when a court will allow a
plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil, there are generally three substantive factors that
plaintiffs must show: 14 first, that the corporation does not have a separate existence
from its shareholders; second, that the corporation, through its shareholders, is
engaged in some type of misconduct; and third, that the misconduct caused the
plaintiff’s asserted injury. 15
Because the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is a product of the common
law, 16 many courts have developed their own articulation of these factors. 17 As a
8

Strasser, supra note 1, at 640.

9

Hodge & Sachs, supra note 1, at 341.

10

See Strasser, supra note 1, at 640.

11

See Hodge & Sachs, supra note 1, at 341.

12

Strasser, supra note 1, at 640 (“Yet these rigid legal rules of limited liability needed a
safety valve to escape unacceptable results and supervise limited liability. In corporate law,
the familiar doctrine of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ is the traditional safety valve and the one
most commonly used . . . .”).
13

Hodge & Sachs, supra note 1, at 344.

14

See id. at 341-42, 344 (noting that “courts have never enunciated a clear test for when
they will pierce the corporate veil”); see also Strasser, supra note 1, at 640 (“Whatever the
difference in their formulation, the core inquiry in each case emphasizes the same two
substantive factors, plus causation of the complained of injury.”).
15

Strasser, supra note 1, at 640-41.

16

Hodge & Sachs, supra note 1, at 346-47.

17

See Strasser, supra note 1, at 641-42.
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result, many courts have inconsistently applied the doctrine. 18 These inconsistencies
have made the doctrine ripe for criticism. 19 Several critics argue that the doctrine
has become so abstract that judicial decisions regarding piercing have become
largely discretionary. 20 This is especially true when it comes to evaluating the
second factor—whether the corporation’s misconduct is sufficient to pierce the
corporate veil. 21 Specifically, courts are divided over whether a corporation’s
misconduct must constitute fraud or whether other types of unjust or inequitable
conduct are sufficient to pierce the veil. 22 Moreover, courts that allow piercing
where the corporation’s conduct was something other than fraud are further divided
as to what types of misconduct will suffice. 23 When courts do articulate standards
for the misconduct, the standards are generally vague and fail to provide guidance to
future cases. 24 This was the conflict among Ohio’s courts of appeals, and this
conflict gave rise to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s latest attempt to set piercing
standards in Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc.
B. The Evolution of Ohio’s Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil
Ohio has a well-established recognition of the principle of limited shareholder
liability, 25 as well as a settled tradition of allowing plaintiffs to pierce the corporate
18

Id. (quoting Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 481
(2001) (stating that the doctrine is “uncertain[ ]” and “lack[s] . . . predictability”)).
19

See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2; Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing
Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the
Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853 (1997); Douglas C. Michael, To Know A Veil, 26 J. CORP.
L. 41 (2000); Strasser, supra note 1.
20
Strasser, supra note 1, at 641 (“Traditional veil piercing has been extensively criticized
for at least the last fifty years and the criticism continues unabated. The core charge is that the
doctrine is expressed at such a high level of abstraction that decisions in individual cases are in
fact highly discretionary with the courts.”).
21

See generally id.

22

See id. at 640-41.

23

Id.

24

Id. at 641. This leads some scholars to argue that courts are heavily influenced by the
facts of the particular case rather than any judicially imposed standards. Kurt A. Strasser is
one critic of piercing the corporate veil who argues that courts have too much discretion when
it comes to implementing the doctrine:
[T]he standards articulated in the cases are quite diverse, giving little general guidance
for future cases, and the results are heavily influenced by the specific facts in
particular cases. Examples of wrongful conduct are as varied as human experience
itself. When necessary to reach what the court views as the correct result, some courts
are willing to treat simple commission of a tort, breach of a contract, or insolvency as
sufficiently wrongful conduct. In effect, these decisions make the requirement of
finding wrongful conduct a formality. However, in many other cases, courts treat this
requirement as an insuperable barrier to relief.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
25

OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 3 (“Dues from private corporations shall be secured by such
means as may be prescribed by law, but in no case shall any stockholder be individually liable
otherwise than for the unpaid stock owned by him or her.”).
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veil. 26 This tradition, however, has not been smooth and steady. Rather, the
doctrine’s evolution has seen many splits and shifts.
North v. Higbee Co. was Ohio’s first attempt to articulate a standard for when
courts should permit a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil. 27 There, the Supreme
Court of Ohio held that piercing the corporate veil “requires that the proof . . . show
not only an excessive control over the subsidiary but the actual exercise of that
control in such a manner as to defraud or wrong the complainant.” 28 Under this
standard, the Court found that the defendant parent company, Higbee Company, was
not liable for the payments on a rent contract made by its subsidiary, the Higbee
Realty Company. 29 Because the parent company had not misled or wronged the
plaintiff, the Court found that the plaintiff could not pierce the corporate veil and
hold the parent company accountable for the rental debt of the subsidiary. 30
More than fifty years after North, the Supreme Court of Ohio attempted to further
clarify what type of misconduct warranted piercing the corporate veil. In Belvedere
Condominium Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., the Court interpreted North as
requiring fraud before piercing could occur. 31 The Court determined that North’s
standard required two elements: “(1) that the corporation was formed in order to
perpetrate a fraud, and (2) that the shareholder’s control of the corporation was
exercised to defraud the party.” 32 Although the Supreme Court of Ohio applied this
new interpretation of North, the lower court in Belvedere, did not apply North at

26
See State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, para. one of the
syllabus (Ohio 1892) (“That a corporation is a legal entity, apart from the natural persons who
compose it, is a mere fiction, introduced for its convenience in the transaction of its business,
and of those who do business with it; but, like every other fiction of the law, when urged to an
intent and purpose not within its reason and policy, may be disregarded.”).
27

North v. Higbee Co., 3 N.E.2d 391, 392-93 (Ohio 1936) (stating that both parties relied
on Michigan’s articulation of disregarding the corporate entity, presumably because Ohio had
not stated a clear position or standard on the doctrine).
28
Id. at 398 (citing FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS
(1931)) (accepting the trial court’s articulation of the standard).
29

Id. at 399.

30

Id.

31

Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 1085
(Ohio 1993). The court went on to cite the syllabus of North to state the standard to pierce the
corporate veil:
The separate corporate entities of a parent and subsidiary corporation will not be
disregarded and the parent corporation will not be held liable for the acts and
obligations of its subsidiary corporation, notwithstanding the facts that the latter was
controlled by the parent . . . in the absence of proof that the subsidiary was formed for
the purpose of perpetrating a fraud and that domination of the parent corporation
over its subsidiary was exercised in such manner as to defraud complainant.
Id.; see also North, 3 N.E.2d at 398 (“Furthermore, upon the question whether the Higbee
Company, under the doctrine laid down by Mr. Powell, wronged these certificate holders, we
must judge the transaction by the financial situation which existed in the fall of 1925 . . . .”).
32

See Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1085.
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all. 33 Instead, it followed the standard set out in Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. General
Products Co. 34 from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 35
In Bucyrus-Erie, the Sixth Circuit recognized that Ohio had not yet set out a clear
test for piercing the corporate veil. 36 In light of this doctrinal vacuum, the court laid
out a three-part test derived from the Second Circuit. 37 The Sixth Circuit stated that:
[T]he corporate fiction should be disregarded when: (1) domination and
control over the corporation by those to be held liable is so complete that
the corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence of its own; (2) that
domination and control was used to commit fraud or wrong or other
dishonest or unjust act, and (3) injury or unjust loss resulted to the
plaintiff from such control and wrong. 38
In Bucyrus-Erie, the Defendant, who was the majority shareholder of General
Products, argued that the jury should have been instructed to determine whether he
used the corporation to perpetrate a fraud. 39 The Sixth Circuit, however, held that
the instruction was not needed because fraud was not a required element for piercing
the corporate veil. 40
On appeal in Belvedere, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with the lower court’s
decision to apply the Sixth Circuit’s standard from Bucyrus-Erie. 41 After finding
that “the Sixth Circuit’s approach to piercing the corporate veil strikes the correct
balance between the principle of limited shareholder liability and the reality that the
corporate fiction is sometimes used by shareholders to protect themselves from
liability for their own misdeeds,” 42 the Supreme Court of Ohio articulated its new
standard:
33

Id. at 1086.

34

Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Gen. Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1981).

35

Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086.

36

Bucyrus-Erie, 643 F.2d at 418 (“No precise test for disregarding the corporate fiction
has been articulated by the courts, each case being regarded as ‘sui generis’ and decidable on
its own facts.” (citing DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d
681 (4th Cir. 1976))).
37

Id.

38

Id. (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
aff’d 599 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979)); see also Berger v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d
991, 995 (5th Cir. 1972).
39

Bucyrus-Erie, 643 F.2d at 418.

40

Id. at 419 (“Though fraud is a frequent ground for application of the alter ego doctrine,
it is not essential. The courts will disregard the corporate fiction when its retention would
produce injustice or inequitable consequences.” (citing State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Standard
Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279, at para. one of the syllabus (Ohio 1892); Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S.
349, 361 (1944); Nat’l Marine Serv. v. C. J. Thibodeaux & Co., 501 F.2d 940, 942 (5th Cir.
1974); Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th
Cir. 1973))).
41

Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086.

42

Id.
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[T]he corporate form may be disregarded and individual shareholders held
liable for corporate misdeeds when (1) control over the corporation by
those to be held liable was so complete that the corporation has no
separate mind, will, or existence of its own, (2) control over the
corporation by those to be held liable was exercised in such a manner as to
commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking to disregard the
corporate entity, and (3) injury or unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff from
such control and wrong. 43
Even though the Supreme Court of Ohio said that it was adopting the Sixth Circuit’s
standard, its second factor differed slightly from that of the Sixth Circuit. 44 While
the Sixth Circuit required that the corporation “commit fraud or wrong or other
dishonest or unjust act,” 45 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that the corporation
must “commit fraud or an illegal act.” 46 Under this standard, the Supreme Court of
Ohio found that the Defendant corporation owner could not be held personally liable
because there was no evidence to show that he used his control to defraud the
plaintiff. 47 Under the Sixth Circuit’s standard, however, the Court may have allowed
piercing if it determined that the defendant’s acts were “dishonest or unjust,” even if
those acts did not qualify as fraudulent. 48 Although the Court did not state that it
changed the Sixth Circuit’s standard, or that there was even any difference between
the two standards, 49 its new articulation began a serious conflict among Ohio’s
appellate courts.
Confusion arose within Ohio’s courts of appeals because the Supreme Court of
Ohio claimed to adopt the Sixth Circuit standard but, in fact, changed the language
of the second factor. Several courts of appeals interpreted Belvedere’s articulation of
the second factor to mean that a plaintiff could pierce the corporate veil when the
defendant’s control over the corporation was done “‘to commit a fraud, illegal, or
other unjust or inequitable act.’” 50 Other districts, however, interpreted Belvedere
more strictly and allowed piercing only in cases of a fraud or an illegal act. 51 This
43

Id.

44

See id.

45

Bucyrus-Erie, 643 F.2d at 418.

46

Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086 (emphasis added).

47

Id. (“We hold that the Association did not introduce sufficient evidence to pierce
RERC’s corporate veil and reach Roark individually. The Association did not introduce any
evidence that Roark used his control over RERC in such a manner as to defraud the
Association. . . . The evidence cited by the court of appeals below clearly show[ed] that Roark
did exercise control over RERC, but mere control over a corporation is not in itself a . . . basis
for shareholder liability.”).
48

See Bucyrus-Erie, 643 F.2d at 418.

49

See, e.g., Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1085-87.

50

See Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538, 543-44 (Ohio 2008) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Wiencek v. Atcole Co., 671 N.E.2d 1339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)).
51

See Collum v. Perlman, No. L-98-1291, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1938, at *9 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 30, 1999).
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conflict among the districts led the Supreme Court of Ohio to address the issue in
Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc. 52 The distinction between the two interpretations is
important, because, as the Supreme Court of Ohio notes, allowing piercing in cases
of “unjust or inequitable conduct” significantly increases plaintiffs’ opportunities to
pierce. 53 Because piercing the corporate veil is meant to apply in very limited
circumstances, the Supreme Court of Ohio certified the conflict in Dombroski to
attempt to strike a balance between the limited applicability of the doctrine and the
occasional need to hold shareholders liable. 54
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: DOMBROSKI V. WELLPOINT, INC.
A. Facts of the Case
For most of her life, Kimberly Dombroski suffered from significant hearing loss
in both of her ears, which rendered her completely deaf. 55 In 2000, Ms. Dombroski’s
doctor recommended that she receive a cochlear implant to restore hearing to her left
ear. 56 After five years with the singular implant, Ms. Dombroski’s doctor advised
that she receive a second implant for her right ear. 57 However, following her
doctor’s request for authorization to implant the second device, Ms. Dombroski’s
insurance company denied her coverage and said that the use of two cochlear
implants was considered “investigational” and, therefore, not covered under her
plan. 58
At this time, Ms. Dombroski contracted with Community Insurance Company for
her health insurance. 59 Anthem UM Services, Inc., as an affiliate of Community
Insurance, administered Ms. Dombroski’s policy along with Anthem Insurance
Company. 60 WellPoint, Inc. owns one hundred percent of the stock of each of these
three corporations. 61 After unsuccessfully appealing the denial with Anthem UM,

52

Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543-44.

53

Id. at 544 (“Adding unjust or inequitable conduct to the second prong of the Belevedere
test significantly increases the number of cases in which a plaintiff could pierce the corporate
veil.”).
54

Id. at 544-45.

55

Id. at 540.

56

Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio defined a cochlear implant as “a small electronic device
that is placed inside a deaf person’s ear and provides him or her with a sense of sound.” Id. at
540 n.1. The court went on to note that such devices are approved by the Food and Drug
Administration and are ninety percent successful. Id.
57

Id. at 540.

58

Id. at 540-41 (noting that Ms. Dombroski’s first implant was covered by a separate
insurance company that was not party to her suit and whose coverage was not at issue here).
59

Id. at 540.

60

Id. at 540-41.

61

Id. at 541.
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Ms. Dombroski filed suit against all four corporations claiming breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, and the tort of insurer bad faith. 62
In support of her claims, Ms. Dombroski alleged that WellPoint, Inc. established
“corporate medical policies” through Anthem Insurance. 63 One of these policies
stated that the implantation of two cochlear implants is an investigational
procedure. 64 Because of this policy, Anthem Insurance and Anthem UM denied
coverage for the second cochlear implant. 65 It was the administration of this specific
policy, Ms. Dombroski alleged, that constituted insurer bad faith. 66
B. Procedural History
In response to Ms. Dombroski’s complaint, WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem
Insurance filed motions to dismiss. 67 Both corporations contended that Ms.
Dombroski failed to allege a basis for piercing the corporate veil that would enable
her to claim liability beyond Anthem UM and Community Insurance. 68 The trial
court in Belmont County granted the companies’ 69 motions to dismiss, and Ms.
Dombroski appealed to the Seventh Appellate District of the Court of Appeals for
Ohio.
The Seventh District Court of Appeals addressed the specific issue of whether
Ms. Dombroski could pierce the corporate veil of Community Insurance such that
she could hold WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem Insurance liable for her bad faith claim. 70

62

Id. The promissory estoppel and breach of contract claims are not at issue here.

63

Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).

64

Id.

65

Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 541; see also Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 228-29.

66

Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 541. Ohio law imposes a duty of good faith on insurers
regarding the “processing and payment of valid claims of [the] insured.” Gillette v. Estate of
Gillette, 837 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (citing Beever v. Cincinnati Life Ins.
Co., Nos. 02AP-543, 02AP-544, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 2663, at *20 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10,
2003)). The insured may sue the insurer for bad faith if “‘[a]n insurer fails to exercise good
faith in the processing of a claim of its insured where its refusal to pay the claim is not
predicated upon circumstances that furnish reasonable justification therefor [sic].’” Id.
(quoting Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, para. one of the syllabus (Ohio
1994)).
67

Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 229.

68

Id. Additionally, both corporations claimed that Ms. Dombroski had failed to state a
claim for which relief could be granted because she was not in privity of contract with either
of them; therefore, the companies argued, she could not assert, nor prevail, on the breach of
good faith claim based on the insurance contract with Community Insurance and Anthem UM.
Id.
69

The court dismissed the complaint against WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem Insurance, but
Community Insurance and Anthem UM remained parties to the suit. Id.
70
The court also decided the issue of whether Ms. Dombroski’s bad faith claim was
actionable, but that issue is not pertinent to the corporate veil discussion because the court
determined that the claim was valid. Id.
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The court reviewed Ms. Dombroski’s complaint using Belvedere’s three-part test 71 to
see if she had sufficiently pled facts that would show her “desire to proceed under
the theory” of piercing the corporate veil. 72
The court quickly found that Ms. Dombroski’s complaint adequately addressed
the first and third prongs of the Belvedere test. 73 The second prong, however, gave
the court more pause. The Seventh District Court of Appeals broadly interpreted the
second prong of Belvedere and said that fraud or illegal acts are not strictly required
to pierce the corporate veil. 74 Instead, the court held that a corporation’s unjust or
inequitable acts are sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. 75 Under this standard, the
court found that Ms. Dombroski’s complaint alleging bad faith and breach of
contract pled sufficient unjust or inequitable acts to meet the second prong of
Belvedere. 76 After finding that the complaint also met the third prong of Belvedere,
the court determined that Ms. Dombroski gave fair notice of an attempt to pierce the
corporate veil and held that the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint was in error. 77
71
Id. at 230. The Supreme Court of Ohio specifically noted that the Belvedere test is the
correct standard when attempting to pierce the veil to reach an individual shareholders or
another corporation. Id. (“[T]he Belvedere test is equally applicable to piercing a corporation
to reach an individual shareholder or owner as it is to piercing a corporation to reach another
corporation.”) (citing Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d
1075, 1085 (Ohio 1993)).
72
The court found that:
A party seeking to pierce the corporate veil is not required to relate the specific
intention in the complaint in order to proceed under the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil. . . . All that is required is that the complaint contain sufficient
information to indicate a desire to proceed under the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil.
Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 230-31 (citing Geier v. Nat’l GG Indus., Inc., No. 98-L-172, 1999
Ohio App. LEXIS 6263, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1999); Dalicandro v. Marrison Rd.
Dev. Co., Nos. 00AP-619, 00AP-656, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1765, at *20 (Ohio Ct. App.
Apr. 17, 2001)).
73

Dombroski, 879 N.E.2d at 231-33 (“Both parties agree that the complaint clearly alleges
that WellPoint controls its subsidiaries to the point that they have no separate mind, will or
existence of their own. The first prong of Belvedere is undisputedly established. . . . In the
complaint, she alleges that she has suffered physical loss, pecuniary loss, emotional distress,
impaired earning capacity, and lessened likelihood of a successful working implantation of a
future right side cochlear implant. She alleges that these injuries have resulted from the
‘control and wrong’ by WellPoint through its subsidiaries due to the corporate medical policy.
This is sufficient to meet the third prong of Belvedere.”).
74

Id. at 232-33.

75

Id. at 233.

76

Id. (“The failure of the duty to act in good faith in handling claims constitutes an unjust
or inequitable act for purposes of pleading piercing the corporate veil.”).
77

Id. The court also went on to analyze whether, as Ms. Dombroski asserted, contractual
privity needed to be relaxed in order for her to pursue her claim against WellPoint, Inc. and
Anthem Insurance. The court ultimately concluded that privity is not required to assert a
claim against a parent company if the corporate veil is pierced. Id. at 234-35. However, the
court’s reasoning is not pertinent to the appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio and, therefore, is
not discussed here.
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WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem Insurance filed a notice to certify a conflict between
the Seventh District Court of Appeals and the Sixth District Court of Appeals. 78 At
this point, the Sixth District interpreted the second prong of Belvedere as limiting
piercing to situations where the corporation committed fraud or an illegal act. 79
Because the Seventh District found that Ms. Dombroski could pierce the corporate
veil by showing that WellPoint, Inc.’s acts were unjust or inequitable, the Seventh
District certified the conflict to the Supreme Court of Ohio. 80 The specific issue
before the Supreme Court of Ohio was:
Does the second prong of Belvedere, which states that the corporate veil
can be pierced when control of the corporation “was exercised in such a
manner as to commit fraud or an illegal act against the person seeking to
disregard the corporate entity,” also allow the corporate veil to be pierced
in cases where control was exercised to commit unjust or inequitable acts
that do not rise to the level of fraud or an illegal act? 81
The Supreme Court of Ohio began its analysis with the Belvedere test. 82 First, the
court accepted Ms. Dombroski’s claim that WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem Insurance
controlled its subsidiaries that administered her policy in such a way that those
subsidiaries did not have their own minds, wills, or existences. 83 The Court then
recognized that it needed to focus on the second prong of the Belvedere test. 84
The Court recognized that the central issue was whether to adopt a broad or strict
construction of the second prong of Belvedere. It noted that the Seventh District’s
interpretation aimed to reconcile Belvedere’s limited wording with the original
purpose of the piercing doctrine. 85 The Supreme Court of Ohio noted that this
reconciliation allows for unjust or inequitable acts because piercing the corporate

78
The Sixth District decisions that the defendants asserted were in conflict with the
Seventh District were Collum v. Perlman, No. L-98-1291, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1938 (Ohio
Ct. App., Lucas County Apr. 30, 1999) and Widlar v. Young, No. L-05-1184, 2006 Ohio App.
LEXIS 777 (Ohio Ct. App., Lucas County Feb. 24, 2006).
79
Collum, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1938, at *3; see also Widlar, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS
777, at *51-53.
80

Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 879 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio 2008). The Ohio Constitution
allows for lower courts to certify conflicts to the state supreme court in certain circumstances:
Whenever the judges of a court of appeals finds that a judgment upon which they have
agreed is in conflict with a judgment pronounced upon the same question by another
court of appeals of the state, the judges shall certify the record of the case to the
supreme court for review and final determination.
OHIO CONST. art IV, § 3(b)(4).
81

Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 116 Ohio St. 3d 1472 (2008) (order certifying a conflict).

82

Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ohio 2008); see also supra p. 957
(discussing the Belvadere test).
83

Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543.

84

Id.

85

See id.
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veil is meant to be an equitable doctrine. 86 It further explained that a broader
interpretation of Belvedere would allow the doctrine to operate more equitably. 87
Although this interpretation may be more equitable, the Court noted that a broader
interpretation would greatly expand plaintiffs’ opportunities to pierce the corporate
veil. 88
While the Seventh District’s interpretation may be too broad, the Supreme Court
of Ohio noted that the Sixth District’s strict construction was too restrictive. 89 The
Court explained that under the Sixth District’s interpretation, piercing is strictly
limited to situations where a corporation commits fraud or an illegal act. 90 Under
this interpretation, Ms. Dombroski’s complaint would fail because she did not allege
that the Defendants had committed fraud or an illegal act. 91 Although piercing
should occur only in the most exceptional circumstances, the Supreme Court of Ohio
determined that Belvedere’s language was too limited to address the “wide variety of
egregious shareholder misdeeds that may occur.” 92
In an effort to address the needs of plaintiffs who are injured in such a manner,
the Supreme Court of Ohio modified its Belvedere test. 93 The court held, “[T]o
fulfill the second prong of the Belvedere test for piercing the corporate veil, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant shareholder exercised control over the
corporation in such a manner as to commit fraud, an illegal act, or a similarly
unlawful act.” 94 The Court further specified that courts should allow plaintiffs to
pierce the corporate veil only when the shareholder defendant has engaged in
extreme misconduct. 95
Finally, the Court held that the tort of insurer bad faith does not constitute the
type of “exceptional wrong” for which piercing the corporate veil was meant to

86

Id. (“Because the plain language of the second prong of the Belvedere test imperfectly
applies to this view, these courts have modified the requirement of ‘fraud or an illegal act’ to
allow for additional forms of misconduct.”).
87

Id. at 544-45.

88

Id. at 544 (“Adding unjust or inequitable conduct to the second prong of the Belvedere
test significantly increases the number of cases in which a plaintiff could pierce the corporate
veil.”).
89
Id. at 545 (“[W]e are convinced that our pronouncement in Belvedere is too limited to
protect other potential parties from the wide variety of egregious shareholder misdeeds that
may occur.”).
90

Id. at 544 (citing Collum v. Perlman, No. L-98-1291, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1938
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1999)).
91
See also id. at 544 n.2 (noting that in her brief to the Supreme Court of Ohio, Ms.
Dombroski argued that the insurer bad faith tort could constitute an illegal act, but because this
issue was not certified to the Court, the Court will not consider it).
92

Id. at 545.

93

Id. at 544-45.

94

Id. at 545 (emphasis added) (noting further that this does not affect the other two prongs
of the test).
95

Id.
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remedy. 96 The Court recognized that Ms. Dombroski’s bad faith claim would be
successful under a standard that allowed piercing for “unjust or inequitable acts,” as
the Seventh District found. 97 Under the Court’s new modification, however, the
Court determined that Ms. Dombroski’s claim against WellPoint, Inc. and Anthem
Insurance must fail. 98
Justice Pfeifer was the only justice to dissent from the majority opinion. 99 He
first notes that Belvedere developed from a line of cases that meant to include unjust
or inequitable acts, as the majority of Ohio’s appellate districts have interpreted. 100
He argues that Bucyrus-Erie’s standard—fraud or wrong or other dishonest or unjust
act—is indicative of this intent. 101 Even though Belvedere’s language differs slightly
from that in Bucyrus-Erie, Justice Pfeifer argues that the Supreme Court of Ohio
merely abbreviated the language to “fraud or an illegal act.” 102 Because the phrase is
merely an abbreviation of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ test, he argues that
Belvedere meant to include unjust or inequitable acts as well. 103
Justice Pfeifer’s dissent also notes that even though most Ohio districts have
adopted the broader construction of the second prong, it still remains very difficult to
pierce the corporate veil. 104 Finally, Justice Pfeifer argues that the majority’s
modification of the Belvedere test did not clarify the second prong; rather, the
additional language “muddied the waters” of when to pierce the corporate veil. 105
Even though Justice Pfeifer disagrees with the majority’s modification of Belvedere,
he says that Ms. Dombroski’s insurer bad faith action still qualifies as a “similarly
unlawful act” for which the majority’s standard would allow piercing. 106 He argues
that insurer bad faith is not a “simple negligent performance of contractual
duties;” 107 what would otherwise be a contract claim, he notes, is “transformed into a
tort action because of the unreasonableness of the insurer’s behavior.” 108 For this
reason, he concludes, Ms. Dombroski’s allegations were sufficient to pierce the
corporate veil, even under the majority’s modification of Belvedere. 109

96

Id.

97

Id. (“Insurer bad faith is a straightforward tort, a basic example of unjust conduct.”).

98

Id.

99

Id. at 546.

100

Id. at 546 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id. at 546-47.

106

Id. at 547.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S MODIFICATION OF THE BELVEDERE TEST AND ITS
LIKELIHOOD TO CAUSE FURTHER CONFLICTS AMONG APPELLATE DISTRICTS
In Dombroski, the Supreme Court of Ohio attempted to make a uniform standard
for Ohio courts to determine when it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil in an
effort to resolve the conflict among the appellate courts. The Court’s attempt,
however, will not result in a resolution of the conflict but will cause conflicts over
the same issue. Ohio’s appellate districts have previously conflicted over this
issue—once following North v. Higbee Co. and again following Belvedere. Both of
these conflicts followed Supreme Court of Ohio attempts to clarify what types of
misconduct would allow a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil. 110 Dombroski v.
WellPoint, Inc. is the Supreme Court of Ohio’s third attempt to resolve this conflict.
However, because the Supreme Court of Ohio has added language but no substance
to the Belvedere test, the appellate districts will surely split along the same lines in
future cases.
If the Supreme Court of Ohio really wants to prevent future conflicts among the
appellate districts, it must set out a new standard that allows piercing when the
corporation has engaged in “fraud or similarly wrongful conduct.” This standard is
consistent with the evolution of Ohio’s doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, and it
would accomplish the Court’s goal of balancing the importance of limited
shareholder liability and shareholder accountability. Moreover, this standard would
accommodate the conflicting standards of the Sixth and Seventh Districts and, in
turn, prevent future conflicts among the appellate courts.
A. The Court’s Modification of the Belvedere Test Will Cause Further Conflicts
Among the Appellate Districts
Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc. is the Supreme Court of Ohio’s third attempt to
resolve the question of whether a corporation’s unjust or inequitable acts are
sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. 111 This attempt, however, is just as confusing
as the Court’s earlier attempts—both of which split the appellate districts over what
types of corporate misconduct warranted piercing. The Court’s third attempt in
Dombroski merely adds to the confusing language with another vague phrase—
“similarly unlawful acts.” This phrase is just as vague as the Court’s previous
language and will similarly cause conflicts among Ohio’s courts of appeals.
The Court’s first attempt to address what types of misconduct warrant piercing
was in North v. Higbee Co. 112 In North, the issue on appeal was similar to that in
Dombroski:
Can the court disregard the fiction of separate corporate entity of the
subsidiary corporation when the facts disclose that a wrong and an
injustice has been perpetrated upon innocent third persons in the absence

110

See supra Part II.B.

111

See generally Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d
1075 (Ohio 1993); North v. Higbee Co., 3 N.E.2d 391 (Ohio 1936).
112

See supra p. 1057.
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of fraud or illegality and hold the parent company liable for the
obligations of its subsidiary? 113
After North, the courts of appeals eventually conflicted over what type of
misconduct warranted piercing. Despite North’s seemingly clear standard that fraud
was required, 114 some appellate districts chose to follow North, and others chose to
follow a broader standard set forth in the Sixth Circuit. 115
Similar to North, in Dombroski, the Supreme Court of Ohio has set out a new
articulation of its piercing standard. Unlike North, however, the Court’s standard is
not as clear. In North, the Court clearly stated that fraud would be the touchstone for
piercing the corporate veil. 116 In Dombroski, however, the Court stated that
“similarly unlawful act[s]” would allow a plaintiff to pierce the veil. 117 If the
appellate districts split when the Supreme Court of Ohio clearly stated that fraud—a
discernable and definable harm 118 —was required for piercing, it is foreseeable that
the Court’s additional vague language in Dombroski will split the districts again.
Because the Supreme Court of Ohio failed to define what type of conduct could be
classified 119 as a “similarly unlawful act,” the modified Belvedere test is left to the
interpretation of the historically conflicted appellate districts. 120
This first conflict among the appellate districts may have occurred because of the
interjection of the Sixth Circuit’s articulation of piercing standards in Bucyrus-Erie
113

North, 3 N.E.2d at 392 (recognizing this as the issue presented before the lower court).

114

Id. at syllabus (“The separate corporate entities of a parent and subsidiary corporation
will not be disregarded and the parent corporation will not be held liable for the acts and
obligations of its subsidiary corporation, notwithstanding the facts that the latter was
controlled by the parent through its stock ownership, and that the officers and directors of the
parent corporation were likewise officers and directors of the subsidiary, in the absence of
proof that the subsidiary was formed for the purpose of perpetuating a fraud and that
domination by the parent corporation over its subsidiary was exercised in such manner as to
defraud the complainant.”).
115

See Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086 n.8. This split also occurred in part because of
Bucyrus-Erie, which interpreted Ohio law as allowing unjust or inequitable acts. BucyrusErie, 643 F.2d at 419.
116

See supra note 31.

117

Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 545.

118

See Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ohio 1987) (“The
elements of an action in actual fraud are: (a) a representation or, where there is a duty to
disclose, concealment of a fact, (b) which is material to the transaction at hand, (c) made
falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to
whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred, (d) with the intent of misleading
another into relying upon it, (e) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment,
and (f) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.”) (citing Burr v. Stark City Bd.
of Comm’rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, para. two of the syllabus (Ohio 1986)).
119

The Court did make clear that insurer bad faith claims would be excluded under its
standard. Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 545 (“Insurer bad faith is a straightforward tort, a basic
example of unjust conduct; it does not represent the type of exceptional wrong that piercing is
designed to remedy.”).
120

See supra Part II.B.
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instead of an interpretation of the Court’s language in North. Even so, the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s attempt to resolve this conflict in Belvedere with a new articulation
of the standard proved just as futile as its previous attempt in North. Belvedere
Condominium Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos. was the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s second attempt to clarify what type of corporate misconduct warranted
piercing the corporate veil. 121 In Belvedere, the court adopted the Sixth Circuit’s
standard and held that piercing required “fraud or an illegal act” on the part of the
corporation. 122 This attempt at clarification failed, and the courts of appeals split
again into those that required solely fraud or illegal acts and those that allowed
unjust or inequitable acts. 123 This conflict was different than the split that followed
North, as this conflict was the product of a difference of interpretation between the
appellate districts 124 rather than the districts simply adopting one test over another. 125
Because the districts interpreted Belvedere’s specific language—“fraud or an illegal
act”—in two different ways, there is nothing to show that Dombroski’s additional
language of “similarly unlawful acts” will prevent that from happening again. If the
districts have previously split over the interpretation of “fraud or an illegal act,” it is
clearly foreseeable that the same split will occur when the modified test merely adds
a synonym for the disputed term. 126
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s language in Dombroski will likely agitate the
appellate districts’ predisposition to splitting over this issue. In Dombroski, the
Court found that the appellate districts that allowed unjust or inequitable acts were
too broad in their interpretations of Belvedere. 127 The Court’s modification of
121

Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086 n.8 (“As a result of Bucyrus-Erie, two irreconcilable
lines of cases have developed in the lower Ohio courts. Some Ohio courts of appeals have
followed North in requiring that fraud in formation must be established. . . . Other courts of
appeals, however, have relied on Bucyrus-Erie and held that a finding of fraud in formation is
not necessary.” (citations omitted)).
122
Id. at 1086. The Supreme Court of Ohio claimed to be adopting the Sixth Circuit
standard over the North standard, but its language abbreviates what the Sixth Circuit requires.
Compare id. with Bucyrus-Erie, 643 F.2d at 418.
123

Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543-44 (“The courts of appeals have interpreted the phrase
‘fraud or an illegal act’ in two different ways.”).
124

See Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543.

125

See supra Part II.B.

126

See also Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 547 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). The only dissenting
justice, Justice Pfeifer, also makes note of the abstraction of the additional language:
The majority believes that it expands on the Belvedere element of a “fraud or an illegal
act” by including the redundancy “or a similarly unlawful act.” Thus, not only may an
“illegal act” satisfy the second element of the Belvedere test, but so will an act that is
similarly unlawful to an illegal act. The new language seems to be pulled from the air.
Is there a notable distinction between an “unlawful” and an “illegal” act? Not that the
majority identifies. The words appear to be two ways of saying the same thing.
Potato, potahto, illegal, unlawful—let’s call the whole thing off.
Id.
127

See id. at 544-45 (“Were we to allow piercing every time a corporation under the
complete control of a shareholder committed an unjust or inequitable act, virtually every close
corporation could be pierced when sued, as nearly every lawsuit sets forth a form of unjust or
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Belvedere in Dombroski, however, does nothing to limit this broad interpretation
because “unlawful” is a common synonym for “illegal. 128 Because “fraud” is a term
whose definition is not up for interpretation, 129 the lower courts’ split arises from its
interpretation of the phrase “illegal acts.” Merely adding a synonym for “illegal” to
language that has proven to be vague 130 and will only perpetuate the confusion
among the courts. Moreover, an “unlawful act” is considered to be “[c]onduct that is
not authorized by law” or “a violation of a civil or criminal law.”131 Even though the
Supreme Court of Ohio indicated that it did not want its modification to allow
piercing in all civil actions, 132 its language, in fact, does just that.
Although the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the broad interpretations of
Belvedere were improper, it also found that strict adherence to Belvedere’s language
of “fraud or an illegal act” was too limited. 133 The Court modified Belvedere’s
language hoping to strike a balance between the concept of limited shareholder
liability and the occasional need to pierce the corporate veil for “specific egregious
acts.” 134 Adding “similarly unlawful acts” to the Belvedere test, however, does
nothing to clarify what those “specific egregious acts” are; all it says is that the
misconduct is not limited to fraud or illegal acts. It seems as if the Court attempted
to take the districts’ two conflicting standards—“fraud or an illegal act” and
“inequitable or unjust acts”—and come out somewhere in the middle. The additional
language, however, is more expansive in practice than the Court argues.
At least one appellate district is already expansively applying Dombroski. In
RCO International Corp. v. Clevenger, 135 the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging
breach of contract and intent to pierce the corporate veil. 136 The Tenth District Court
of Appeals, which had previously allowed piercing in cases of unjust conduct, 137
held that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. 138
The court cited Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc. saying, “While demonstrating . . . fraud
inequitable action and close corporations are by definition controlled by an individual or small
group of shareholders.”).
128

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 763 (8th ed. 2004).

129

See supra note 118 (listing the elements of fraud in Ohio).

130

This language is proven to be vague because it has been subjected to different
interpretations among the courts.
131

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1574.

132

See supra note 127 and accompanying text.

133

See Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 544.

134

See id. at 544, 545 (“In view of the reality that shareholders could seriously misuse the
corporate form and evade personal liability under the second prong as presently worded, we
find it necessary to modify the second prong of the Belvedere test to allow for piercing in the
event that egregious wrongs are committed by shareholders.”).
135

RCO Int’l Corp. v. Clevenger, 904 N.E.2d 941 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

136

Id. at 942.

137

Swayne v. Beebles Invs., 891 N.E.2d 1216, 1228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (interpreting
Belvedere to allow piercing when the corporation’s conduct was unjust).
138

RCO, 904 N.E.2d at 943.
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is one way to meet the second prong of the Belvedere test, a plaintiff may also meet
the same by demonstrating ‘an illegal act, or a similarly unlawful act.’” 139 Despite
the Supreme Court of Ohio’s intent in Dombroski to avoid piercing every time a
corporation is sued, the Tenth District has continued to apply its unjust conduct
standard through Dombroski’s “similarly unlawful acts” language. 140 Like RCO
International, other appellate districts will likely revert back to their pre-Dombroski
standards because the Supreme Court of Ohio’s language is too vague to give any
true guidance. Because Dombroski’s language is too vague to prevent another split
among the appellate districts, the Supreme Court of Ohio should set out a new
standard for what types of corporate misconduct will allow a plaintiff to pierce the
veil.
B. The Supreme Court of Ohio Should Set Forth a New Standard that Allows
Piercing in Cases of “Fraud or Similarly Wrongful Conduct”
The Supreme Court of Ohio must set a new standard for when plaintiffs may
pierce the corporate veil because the modification of Belvedere in Dombroski is no
clearer than the previous language that had already split the appellate districts. 141
Instead, the Supreme Court of Ohio should adopt a new standard that allows piercing
in cases of “fraud or similarly wrongful conduct.” This standard is consistent with
the foundational principles of the piercing doctrine and accomplishes the Supreme
Court of Ohio’s goal of balancing the importance of limited liability and the
occasional need to pierce the corporate veil. Moreover, this standard would
accommodate the conflicting standards of the Sixth and Seventh Districts and,
therefore, prevent future conflicts among other appellate courts.
Modifying the Belvedere test to allow for wrongful acts in addition to fraud is
consistent with the fundamental principles of the piercing doctrine and Ohio’s
piercing jurisprudence.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “wrongful” as
“[c]haracterized by unfairness or injustice . . . [c]ontrary to law; unlawful . . . .” 142
Under this definition, courts would be permitted to pierce the veil when a
corporation has engaged in unjust conduct, similar to the Seventh District
standard. 143 Piercing the corporate veil is an equitable doctrine for plaintiffs to
ensure fair dealing between shareholders and third parties. 144 It is meant to balance
the importance of the principle of limited shareholder liability and the occasional
need to hold shareholders accountable. 145 To accomplish this balance, the majority

139

Id. at 944 (quoting Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 538 (Ohio 2008)).

140

Id.

141

See supra Part II.A.

142

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1644.

143

See supra Part II.B.

144

See Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 543; see also Michael, supra note 19, at 55.

145

See Strasser, supra note 1, at 640.
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of courts have said that fraud is not the only misconduct that will warrant piercing
the corporate veil. 146
Incorporating the phrase “similarly wrongful acts” into the Ohio’s piercing
standard will expand the standard beyond the strict limits of fraud, as the Supreme
Court of Ohio desired in Dombroski. 147 This standard, however, would not allow
piercing in all cases of injustice, as the Supreme Court of Ohio feared the Seventh
District’s standard would. 148 Because the standard requires that the wrongful
conduct be similar to fraud, courts would be limited to piercing in cases where the
injustice or unfairness—as the definition includes—is as serious or similarly serious
to the act of fraud. 149 This would prevent, as the Supreme Court of Ohio intended,
the application of the doctrine to every suit brought against a corporation.
This standard provides more guidance than Dombroski’s “similarly unlawful
acts” standard because it is more restrictive. In the Supreme Court of Ohio’s
modification, “similarly unlawful act[s]” follows “illegal act[s],” 150 but it does not
serve as a limitation on that phrase because “unlawful” is a common synonym for
“illegal.” 151 Because the definition of “wrongful” incorporates illegality and
injustice, the phrase qualifies and limits itself. Therefore, if a plaintiff seeks to
pierce the corporate veil based on an unjust or inequitable act under this standard,
that plaintiff would have to show that those acts are considered “similarly wrongful.”
This would require the plaintiff to show not only that the wrongful conduct is
similarly serious to fraud but that the injustice complained of is illegal as well.
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio should allow piercing in cases of fraud or
similarly wrongful conduct because this standard is consistent with the roots of
Ohio’s piercing jurisprudence. In North, the Supreme Court of Ohio laid out a
standard that required fraud before the corporate veil could be pierced. 152 Later, in
Belvedere, the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’
standard and thereby expanded the piercing doctrine to cases of “fraud or an illegal
act.” 153 This articulation, however, was an abridgement of the Sixth Circuit’s
146
Id. at 640-41 (“Must the wrongful conduct rise to the level of common law fraud?
While New Mexico and a few other jurisdictions appear to say yes, the prevailing view is that
common law fraud is not required to support piercing.”).
147

Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 545 (“[H]aving reviewed the various tests for piercing the
corporate veil developed by other authorities, we are convinced that our pronouncement in
Belvedere is too limited to protect other potential parties from the wide variety of egregious
shareholder misdeeds that may occur.”).
148

Id. at 544-45.

149

See id. at 545 (noting that piercing the corporate veil should not allow shareholders to
be insulated from liability when their acts “are as objectionable as fraud or illegality”).
150

Id.

151

See supra note 128 and accompanying text.

152

North v. Higbee Co., 3 N.E.2d 391, 398 (Ohio 1936).

153

Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075, 1086
(Ohio 1993) (“We feel the Sixth Circuit’s approach to piercing the corporate veil strikes the
correct balance between the principle of limited shareholder liability and the reality that the
corporate fiction is sometimes used by shareholders to protect themselves from liability for
their own misdeeds.”); see also supra pp. 1058-59.
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standard that allowed for piercing in cases of “fraud or wrong or other dishonest or
unjust act.” 154 In adopting this standard, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed that the
Sixth Circuit standard correctly balanced the interests of limited liability and justice
for injured plaintiffs. 155 Furthermore, in Dombroski, the Supreme Court of Ohio
recognized that piercing is required for a “wide variety of egregious shareholder
misdeeds,” including those that were not fraud or explicitly illegal. 156 Adopting the
standard that allows piercing in cases of fraud or similarly wrongful acts would
further the Supreme Court of Ohio’s historical intent to allow injustices and
inequities to pierce the corporate veil when they are “as objectionable as fraud or
illegality.” 157 The Supreme Court of Ohio should adopt a standard where plaintiffs
may pierce the corporate veil when the corporation has committed fraud or similarly
wrongful acts because this standard is consistent with fundamentals of the doctrine
and its evolution in Ohio.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s modification of the Belvedere test in Dombroski v.
WellPoint, Inc. is unclear, inconsistent, and another failed attempt to resolve the
conflict among Ohio’s courts of appeals. Because the Court has promulgated yet
another confusing standard for what conduct will allow plaintiffs to pierce the
corporate veil, Ohio’s courts of appeals are likely to conflict, once again, over this
issue.
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil works as a check on the established
corporate law principle of limited shareholder liability. Piercing allows injured
plaintiffs to hold shareholders liable for their misconduct despite the general rule that
shareholders are not personally liable for the debts of the corporation. It is an
equitable doctrine that is based in common law and has no consistent standard
throughout the courts. This inconsistency is especially true among Ohio’s courts,
which have previously conflicted over its piercing standards. The Supreme Court of
Ohio has attempted to resolve this division in North and in Belvedere. These
attempts, however, have proved futile and have only caused further splits among the
districts.
The Supreme Court of Ohio’s latest attempt in Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc. is
equally futile because its modification of Belvedere test is merely cosmetic. Its
additional language of “similarly unlawful acts” is likely to cause yet another
conflict among Ohio’s courts of appeals as to what types of corporate misconduct
warrant piercing the veil. Because the appellate districts conflicted over this issue
following previous attempts at resolution, and will likely split again following
Dombroski, the Supreme Court of Ohio should set out a different standard. To
prevent another conflict in the lower courts, the Supreme Court of Ohio should adopt
a standard in which fraud or similarly wrongful conduct would allow plaintiffs to
154

See supra pp. 1059.

155

See Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 1086.

156

Dombroski, 895 N.E.2d at 545.

157

Id. (“Limiting piercing to cases of fraud or illegal acts protects the established principle
of limited liability, but it insulates shareholders when they abuse the corporate form to commit
acts that are as objectionable as fraud or illegality.”).
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pierce the corporate veil. This standard is preferable to the standard set out in
Dombroski because it is more consistent with the purpose of the piercing doctrine,
and it accomplishes the Supreme Court of Ohio’s goal of balancing the importance
of limited liability and the occasional need to hold shareholders liable.
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